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INTRODUCTION 
George, a commercial diver,1 is employed by Black Mud Diving, Inc. 
(“Black Mud”). Black Mud is a professional diving company based out of 
New Orleans, Louisiana, and it partners with Blue Mountain Drilling Co. to 
assist in its drilling operations.2 For months at a time, George lives on Black 
Mud’s various vessels and goes out to numerous drilling rigs to dive and 
perform underwater operations off the drilling rigs and oil wells. He is not 
assigned to these vessels,3 but the vessels transport George and other divers 
to the drilling rigs and provide a platform from which they work and store 
their monitoring and diving equipment. George neither assists in the 
navigation of nor performs other work on any of the vessels. After several 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2018, by COLTON V. ACOSTA. 
 1. The Louisiana Supreme Court articulated a so-called “diver’s exception” to 
the jurisprudential requirement that an employee be working for an identifiable fleet 
of vessels to have seaman’s status in Wisner v. Prof’l Divers of New Orleans, 731 So. 
2d 200, 205 (La. 1999). Landry v. Specialty Diving of La., Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 629, 
634 (E.D. La. 2003), aff’d, 110 Fed. App’x 386 (5th Cir. 2004). The Wisner court 
identified divers’ work as “inherently maritime.” Wisner, 731 So. 2d at 204. Wisner, 
however, dealt with a different issue—namely, the identifiable fleet of vessels 
requirement—and, at least within the Fifth Circuit, divers have only been held to be 
seaman if they satisfied 30% of their working time on board a vessel. See Willis v. 
Fugro Chance, Inc., 278 F. App’x 443, 446–47 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding diver did not 
qualify as a seaman because he did not spend 30% of time on board a vessel); see also 
Little v. Amoco Prod. Co., 734 So. 2d 933, 939 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (finding diver did 
not qualify as seaman even though he was on a vessel for 30% of his working time 
only because of an usual period of employment due to injury); Landry, 299 F. Supp. 
2d 629 (finding diver did not qualify as a seaman because he did not spend 30% of 
time on board a vessel). See Pickle v. Int’l Oilfield Divers, Inc., 791 F.2d 1237, 1240 
(5th Cir. 1986) (finding that because diver spent 90% of his working hours on board 
a vessel, he qualified as a seaman). Other courts, however, have held that divers are 
seamen even without 30% of work done on a vessel. Rather than focusing on the 30% 
of time on a vessel requirement, these courts have examined whether the diver was 
exposed to marine perils and was in service to a vessel or fleet of vessels. See, e.g., 
Pettis v. Bosarge Diving, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1230 (S.D. Ala. 2010) (holding 
that the diver was a seaman because of the inherently maritime nature of his work and 
that he worked in the service of the ship). 
 2. These facts are loosely derived from a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, 
Wallace v. Oceaneering Int’l, 727 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1984), though the facts have been 
altered to illustrate the problem this Comment addresses. If its facts were the same as 
here, Wallace would have been overruled by Alexander v. Express Energy Services 
Operating, L.P., 784 F.3d 1032, 1036 (5th Cir. 2015); thus, these facts highlight the 
problems for such workers if they were not assigned to the vessels. 
 3. Wallace was assigned to the vessels. Wallace, 727 F.2d at 430. 
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months on the vessels, he is paid and then taken back to New Orleans for 
a few weeks on land, where he works for Black Mud to maintain diving 
equipment and perform other related tasks. 
Two days after coming on board on the latest venture, George’s 
supervisor instructs him to make an extremely deep and dangerous dive.4 
During the dive, a cable snaps, and its recoil throws him to the ocean floor.5 
The cable rolls back and strikes him in his back and shoulders, leaving him 
dazed and injured.6 In response to this accident, George rises to his first 
decompression stop, where he is put on an inadequate decompression 
schedule.7 As a result, he contracts severe decompression sickness and, per 
proper recompression procedure, must be placed in a recompression chamber 
within five minutes.8 His supervisor causes a delay in the procedure that 
results in George sustaining serious injuries, including a drop in his 
intelligence quotient, debilitation of his motor faculties, double vision, and 
depression.9 George wishes to bring a negligence action against his employer. 
Additionally, George’s wife, Susan, desires to bring an action for loss of 
consortium and other non-pecuniary losses.10 Their ability to bring these 
actions depends upon whether George is classified as a seaman. This 
Comment considers this question. 
Accordingly, the couple’s attorney files a claim in the Eastern District 
of Louisiana, and the litigation proceeds until Black Mud files a motion 
for summary judgment on the issue of seaman status.11 Black Mud argues 
                                                                                                             
 4. Id. at 431. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.  
 9. In Wallace, the injured worker also complained of an occasional nervous 
jerk and the permanent use of crutches. Id. 
 10. An action for loss of consortium is an action for loss of intimacy and 
companionship in the marital relationship. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY 
AND MARITIME LAW 168 (4th ed. 2004). These potential damages are not considered 
pecuniary damages. Id. Because seamen and their spouses are only allowed to recover 
pecuniary damages, the spouse of a seaman cannot sue for loss of consortium. Id. at 
16970 (“[L]oss of consortium and society are recoverable under the general maritime 
law except in actions by seamen against their employers and where the cause of action 
is based on a statute that precludes such damages.”).  
 11. Seaman status is important because seamen are granted greater protections 
than other marine workers and have an action under the Jones Act for negligence, 
under which it is easier to prove causation than that under general maritime law. 
Therefore, it is extremely beneficial in most instances for a worker to be a seaman 
rather than another type of maritime employee. John W. deGravelles, Harbor Tug 
& Barge Co. v. Papai: Another Turn in the Labyrinth?, 10 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 209, 
1384 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
 
 
that George cannot be a seaman because he did not spend 30% or more of 
his working time12 aboard a vessel.13 The only time he was on board a 
vessel was to store his equipment, eat, sleep, rest, or be transported to the 
places of his employment. These tasks, Black Mud argues, should not 
qualify as work on board a vessel for determining seaman status. The 
Eastern District grants Black Mud’s motion to deny George seaman status, 
following the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding in Alexander v. 
Express Energy Operating Services, L.P.14 
In Alexander, Michael Alexander worked on a fixed platform and was 
injured by a piece of equipment rolling onto his foot.15 Alexander sued his 
employer, Express Energy Operating Services, L.P. (“Express”), under the 
Jones Act16 in the Eastern District of Louisiana. The Eastern District granted 
Express’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Alexander was not a 
seaman.17 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that 
to qualify as a seaman per the second prong of Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis,18 a 
                                                                                                             
209 (1998) (listing these protections as maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness, and 
a negligence action under the Jones Act); Andrew Hoang Do, Seaman Remedies 
and Maritime Releases: A Practical Consideration, 7 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 379 (1995); 
see Comeaux v. T.L. James & Co., 702 F.2d 1023, 1024 (5th Cir. 1983); Charles v. 
W. Indies Transp., 631 F. Supp. 1023, 1025 (D.P.R. 1986). 
 12. This time would be calculated by factoring in the number of days George 
is employed by Black Mud. For instance, by this interpretation, if George is 
employed for 100 days and works for 30 days on board a vessel, he would have 
worked on board a vessel for 30% of the time. 
 13. Alexander v. Express Energy Servs. Operating, L.P., 784 F.3d 1032, 1036 
(5th Cir. 2015) (holding that because Alexander did not work on board a vessel 
for at least 30% of time, he was not a seaman). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2018). “A seaman injured in the course 
of employment or, if the seaman dies from the injury, the personal representative of 
the seaman may elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, 
against the employer.” Id. Prior to the passage of the Jones Act, a seaman could not 
sue for negligence against his employer. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903); 
Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995). Congress passed the Act to fill 
that gap in protection. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 354. 
 17. Alexander v. Express Energy Operating Servs., L.P., 2014 WL 1763172 
(E.D. La. Apr. 30, 2014) aff’d on other grounds, 784 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 18. The United States Supreme Court’s seminal decision on this issue, 
Chandris, 515 U.S. at 357–68, delineated two prongs for seaman status: First, 
an employee’s duties must contribut[e] to the function of the vessel or to 
the accomplishment of its mission . . . . Second, . . . a seaman must have 
a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such 
vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature. 
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worker must have performed at least 30% of his work on a vessel or 
identifiable fleet of vessels.19 Accordingly, workers who perform a 
significant portion of their work on navigable waters, but not on board a 
vessel, no longer qualify as seamen. In this way, the Fifth Circuit 
misconstrued Chandris as requiring employees to do 30% of their work 
aboard a vessel when, instead, Chandris identifies the purpose of the second 
prong as distinguishing between those employees who are land-based and 
those who are regularly exposed to marine perils.20 In Alexander, the court 
used the United States Supreme Court’s language in Chandris to reach a 
result that will eliminate some amphibious workers’21 seaman status.22 After 
Alexander, workers like George who are regularly exposed to marine 
perils,23 for which the Jones Act was passed,24 and who are “doing the ship’s 
work”25 will not be afforded the protections of seaman status if they do not 
work on board a vessel for 30% of the time. George, then, would not 
necessarily lose his case for seaman status despite being exposed to marine 
perils and doing the ship’s work. 
                                                                                                             
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 19. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1036. 
 20. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 36970 (“The fundamental purpose of this substantial 
connection requirement is . . . to separate the sea-based maritime employees who are 
entitled to Jones Act protection from those land-based workers who have only a 
transitory or sporadic connection to a vessel in navigation, and therefore whose 
employment does not regularly expose them to the perils of the sea.” (citing 1B A. 
JENNER, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 11a (7th ed. 1994))). 
 21. Used primarily in the context of longshoremen, the term “amphibious 
workers” refers to those maritime workers whose work takes place both on land 
and over water. Here and elsewhere in this Comment, the term is used broadly.  
 22. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1034 (reading Chandris as requiring a seaman to 
work on board a vessel for 30% of the time). 
 23. A term of art in maritime law, “perils of the sea” refers to all perils that are 
unique to navigable waters, such as rivers. See Jones v. Pitcher Co., 3 Stew & P. 135, 
17677 (Ala. 1833). The term “marine perils” is used instead in this Comment to 
reflect more accurately the term’s intent, which is any peril that occurs over water, 
such as the dangers of a vessel capsizing, drowning, storms, dangerous wildlife, 
among others. In a recent Fifth Circuit decision, the court noted that both workers who 
are employed on “the quiet waters of a Potomac creek” and “the angry waves of the 
Atlantic” are exposed to these marine perils. Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 
F.3d 927, 934 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 
497 (2005)). 
 24. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 38586 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 25. Id. at 372 (majority opinion) (citing McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 
498 U.S. 337, 356 (1991)). 
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Meanwhile, Alexander exposes employers to greater liability because 
some of these non-seaman workers are able to bring general maritime tort 
claims.26 For instance, in those limited situations in which the “dual 
capacity”27 doctrine applies, workers like George may bring an action for 
punitive damages against their employers,28 and spouses like Susan may 
sue for loss of consortium;29 these actions are not available if the workers 
qualify as seamen.30 Finally, the lower courts within the Fifth Circuit’s 
jurisdiction are left with less discretion in cases in which the employee is 
regularly exposed to marine perils by doing the ship’s work but is not 
working on board a vessel for 30% of time. 
To explore these issues, Part I of this Comment provides background 
through a discussion of the evolution of seaman status—from the term’s 
original meaning under maritime law to the current two-pronged test from 
Chandris. It particularly focuses on the second prong of the United States 
Supreme Court’s test. Part II of this Comment describes the facts, procedural 
history, and reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Alexander, arguing that its 
                                                                                                             
 26. See McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 390–91 (5th Cir. 
2014) (holding that recovery for unseaworthiness under Jones Act or general 
maritime law is limited to pecuniary losses, which does not include punitive 
damages); Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 37 (1990) (holding that a 
maritime cause of action for wrongful death does not include loss of society); see 
also Murray v. Anthony J. Bertucci Const. Co., 958 F.2d 127, 132 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(extending Miles to deny punitive damages recovery to a seaman); Guevara v. 
Mar. Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995), abrogated by Atl. Sounding 
Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 424–25 (2009) (finding seaman is entitled to seek 
punitive damages for willful and wanton failure to pay maintenance and cure). 
 27. If the employer is also the vessel owner and acting in its capacity as vessel 
owner, then the injured worker may have a claim against the employer in that capacity. 
33 U.S.C. §§ 904, 905(b), 933 (2018). See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 
462 U.S. 523 (1983); Jones v. Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring Co., 354 F. App’x 143 
(5th Cir. 2009). 
 28. See The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546, 558 (1818) (stating that punitive 
damages may be awarded for gross, wanton, and outrageous conduct); Gallagher 
v. The Yankee, 9 Fed. Cas. 1091, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 1859) (finding that punitive 
damages could be awarded against a vessel master who illegally transported the 
plaintiff to the Sandwich Islands); see also In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d 
89 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding punitive damages were not available); In re Complaint 
of Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that punitive 
damages may be awarded for gross, wanton, and outrageous conduct). 
 29. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 10, at 16970. 
 30. Miles, 498 U.S. at 37 (holding in part that loss of consortium is not 
included in an action under the Jones Act); McBride, 768 F.3d at 390–91 (holding 
that non-pecuniary damages, such as punitive damages for unseaworthiness, are 
not available to seamen). 
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holding severely impacts and improperly limits seaman status. Part III of 
this Comment presents solutions to these problems by suggesting a 
preferred reading of Chandris, considering the ramifications of such a 
reading on seaman status and the maritime industry. Part IV contains a 
brief conclusion summarizing these solutions. 
I. FROM “ONE WHO LIVES HIS LIFE UPON THE SEA”31 TO THE TWO-
PRONGED TEST 
Maritime law has long recognized that the rights of seamen exceed those 
of non-seamen.32 Whether workers have attained seaman status determines 
the rights and remedies available to injured workers and informs employers 
when making hiring decisions, defending against claims, and purchasing 
insurance coverage.33 Seamen are distinguished from longshoremen34 and 
general maritime workers,35 whose status and protections are notably 
different. 
In general, courts view seamen as “wards of the admiralty,”36 and their 
rights are protected both through general maritime law and congressional 
action in three separate but interconnected ways.37 First, seamen have the right 
to recover maintenance and cure,38 which includes wages, cost of living, and 
medical care owed to seamen “who become ill or injured while in service of 
                                                                                                             
 31. Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 157 (1934). 
 32. deGravelles, supra note 11. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Qualifying as such would grant them the protections of The Longshore and 
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), 33 U.S.C. § 902 (2018). The 
LHWCA defines those covered by the Act as “any person engaged in maritime 
employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring 
operations, and any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and 
ship-breaker . . . .” § 902(3). 
 35. Qualifying as such, and not as seamen or longshoremen, would grant 
them the standard of care owed after Kermerac v. Compagnie Generale 
Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959). 
 36. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995) (quoting Harden v. 
Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 48385 (C.C.D. Me. 1823)). 
 37. See Edward M. Bull III, Seaman Status Revisited: A Practical Guide to 
Status Determination, 6 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 547, 552 (1994) (describing these 
protections as “the seaman’s remedial trident”). 
 38. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903); see Cortes v. Balt. Insular Line, 
Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 37071 (1932). 
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a vessel”39 until they reach maximum medical improvement.40 Second, 
seamen have a general maritime law claim for injuries incurred as a result 
of the unseaworthiness41 of a vessel.42 Finally, seamen have an action 
against their employer for negligence under the Jones Act.43 These actions 
compose the “trilogy of heightened legal protections (unavailable to other 
maritime workers) that seamen receive because of their exposure to the 
‘perils of the sea.’”44 The law grants seamen greater protections than other 
marine workers,45 and it is easier to prove causation under a Jones Act 
action for negligence than under general maritime law.46 Therefore, it is 
extremely beneficial in most instances for a worker to be a seaman rather 
than another type of maritime employee. 
Before 1920, general maritime law recognized only the first two of 
these rights of action for seamen.47 Prior to the passage of the Jones Act, a 
seaman could not sue for negligence against his employer;48 Congress 
passed the Act to fill that gap in protection.49 Congress did not define 
                                                                                                             
 39. Jefferson v. Baywater Drilling, L.L.C., No. 14-1711, 2015 WL 365526, 
at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 27, 2015). 
 40. Id. 
 41. A vessel owner owes a duty to a seaman to keep the vessel and all its 
appurtenances in a seaworthy condition. The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175. See 
Cortes, 287 U.S. at 37071. To be in a “seaworthy condition” means to be in a 
condition reasonably suitable and fit to be used for the purpose or use for which 
the vessel was provided or intended. 8TH CIR. MODEL CIV. JURY INSTR. §§ 4.70, 
17.12 (2017). An unseaworthy condition may result from lack of an adequate 
crew, lack of adequate manpower to perform a particular task on the vessel, or 
improper use of otherwise seaworthy equipment. §§ 4.70, 17.12. 
 42. The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175; see also Cortes, 287 U.S. at 37071. 
 43. The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2018). 
 44. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995) (citing G. GILMORE & C. 
BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6–21, pp. 328–29 (2d ed. 1975)). In Naquin v. 
Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927, 935 (5th Cir. 2014), the court discussed that 
terms and phrases such as “perils of the sea,” “sea-based,” and “sea-based duties” 
should not be understood literally. Rather, “we have dozens of cases finding oilfield 
workers and other ‘brown-water’ workers on drilling barges and other vessels 
qualified as seamen even though they spent all their work time on these vessels 
submerged in quiet inland canals and waterways.” Naquin, 744 F.3d at 935. 
 45. deGravelles, supra note 11, at 209 (listing these protections as maintenance 
and cure, unseaworthiness, and a negligence action under the Jones Act). 
 46. Hoang Do, supra note 11, at 388; see Comeaux v. T.L. James & Co., 702 
F.2d 1023, 1024 (5th Cir. 1983); Charles v. W. Indies Transp., 631 F. Supp. 1023, 
1025 (D.P.R. 1986). 
 47. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 354. 
 48. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903); Chandris, 515 U.S. at 354. 
 49. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 354. 
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“seaman” in the Jones Act,50 and initially, the Supreme Court ruled that 
Congress intended to include all workers who fell within the established 
meaning under general maritime law: “a seaman is a mariner of any 
degree, one who lives his life upon the sea.”51 Congress later gave context 
to the Jones Act definition of “seaman” when it passed the Longshore and 
Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act (“LHWCA”).52 The LHWCA 
provides coverage to a variety of land-based workers but excludes from 
coverage “a master or member of a crew of any vessel.”53 
The Court interpreted this exclusion to mean that the definition of 
“seaman” in the Jones Act should be “a master or member of a crew of 
any vessel.”54 Thus, the Jones Act and LHWCA are mutually exclusive,55 
and now, the essential requirement for Jones Act coverage appears in 
another statute.56 For classic seamen—those workers who are assigned 
permanently to a vessel or fleet of vessels and spend all of their working 
time on board a vessel on navigable water—the question of seaman status 
is no question at all. For amphibious workers, however, the question 
remains more difficult. Notwithstanding this clarification of “seaman” in 
the Jones Act, the determination of seaman status remains challenging.57 
A. The Lower Courts’ First Formulations 
In 1941, the First Circuit Court of Appeals developed the first 
jurisprudential test for seaman status.58 In Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co., 
the court held that the test contained the following elements: that (1) the 
vessel on which the seaman served be in navigation; (2) the worker have 
a more or less permanent connection with the vessel; and (3) the worker 
be aboard primarily to aid in navigation.59 The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals adopted this formulation60 but modified the “more or less 
                                                                                                             
 50. Id. at 355; The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2018). 
 51. Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 15759 (1934). 
 52. The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 902 
(2018). 
 53. § 902(3)(G); Chandris, 515 U.S. at 355. 
 54. McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 347 (1991) (citing § 
902(3)(G)). 
 55. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 35556. 
 56. McDermott Int’l, 498 U.S. at 347; § 902; The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 
30104–30106 (2018). See Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 7 (1946). 
 57. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 358; deGravelles, supra note 11, at 210. 
 58. Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co., 123 F.2d 991, 99495 (1st Cir. 1941). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Salgado v. M.J. Rudolph Corp., 514 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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permanent connection”61 language and, instead, required a connection that 
was “substantial in terms of its . . . duration and . . . nature.”62 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals tried a different tack in Offshore Co. 
v. Robison.63 In its holding, the court abandoned the traditional navigation 
requirement and devised two elements for seaman status: (1) the worker 
must be assigned permanently to a vessel or perform a substantial part of his 
work thereon; and (2) the worker’s employment must contribute to the 
function of the vessel and the accomplishment of its mission, maintenance, 
or anchorage for future trips.64 After Robison, the Fifth Circuit modified its 
rule to include a worker who was employed on an “identifiable fleet” of 
vessels.65 Then, in Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., the court added a 
“temporal gloss” to the requirements and began to require substantial time 
spent on board a vessel.66 Since Barrett, the court, as a “rule of thumb,” 
required that at least 30% of an amphibious worker’s employment time be 
spent working on board a vessel for that worker to qualify as a seaman.67 
Until Chandris, the other lower federal courts all required at least “a 
significant connection to a vessel in navigation,”68 but all remained divided 
on the test for seaman status.69 
B. The Supreme Court Drops Anchor to Weigh in on Seaman Status 
Attempting to resolve this conflict among the lower courts, the 
Supreme Court decided four cases on seaman status between 1991 and 
1997.70 The first, McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, concerned a worker 
                                                                                                             
 61. Carumbo, 123 F.2d at 995. 
 62. Salgado, 514 F.2d at 755. 
 63. Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Braniff v. Jackson Ave.-Gretna Ferry, Inc., 280 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1960). 
 66. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 366 (1995) (discussing Barrett v. 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc)). 
 67. Id. at 367 (1995) (noting that the Fifth Circuit has consistently required 
about 30% of a worker’s time to be spent on board a vessel). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See, e.g., Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co., 123 F.2d 991, 99495 (1st Cir. 
1941); Salgado v. M.J. Rudolph Corp., 514 F.2d 750, 755 (2d Cir. 1975); Robison, 
266 F.2d at 779. 
 70. deGravelles, supra note 11, at 211; McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 
498 U.S. 337 (1991) (holding that to be a seaman, the worker must be doing the 
ship’s work); Sw. Marine v. Gizoni, 520 U.S. 81 (1991) (holding that seaman status 
could not be denied to a maritime worker merely because his occupation fell within 
the parameters of the LHWCA); Chandris, 515 U.S. at 363; Harbor Tug & Barge Co. 
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who failed to aid in the navigational function of the vessels on which he 
served.71 Wilander was a paint foreman who was injured when a pressurized 
pipe exploded on the fixed platform where he was working.72 He brought an 
action for Jones Act negligence.73 The Supreme Court granted Wilander 
seaman status, deciding that aiding in a vessel’s navigation was not 
necessarily required to qualify as a seaman.74 The Court held, instead, that 
to be seamen, workers must be “doing the ship’s work”75 by “contribut[ing] 
to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission.”76 The 
Court concluded that the employees’ jobs were not determinative; rather, 
their connection to a vessel was the determinative factor.77 
In Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, the Court addressed the nature of that 
connection, using a “status-based standard”78 to determine whether workers 
were fundamentally land-based or sea-based.79 The Court emphasized that 
lower courts should not look at a mere “snapshot” of the work of the 
employees; rather, courts should look at the employees’ overall connection to 
a vessel or fleet of vessels.80 The Chandris Court then partially followed the 
test from Robison81 and delineated two requirements for seaman status. First, 
an employee’s duties must ‘contribut[e] to the function of the vessel 
or to the accomplishment of its mission . . . . Second . . . a seaman 
                                                                                                             
v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548 (1997) (holding that the identifiable group of vessels 
requirement needed the element of common ownership or control). 
 71. McDermott Int’l, 498 U.S. 337. 
 72. Id. at 339. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 347; see also Christine M. Gimeno, Persons and Employments 
within Act, 78A C.J.S. SEAMEN § 203 (2016). 
 75. McDermott Int’l, 498 U.S. at 355. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 35354; see also deGravelles, supra note 11, at 212. 
 78. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 358 (1995); see also deGravelles, 
supra note 11, at 212. 
 79. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 363. 
 80. Id. (citing Easley v. S. Shipbuilding Corp., 965 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1050 (1993)). 
 81. Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959) (holding that 
there are two elements for seaman status: that (1) the worker must be assigned 
permanently to a vessel or perform a substantial part of his work thereon; and (2) 
the worker’s employment must contribute to the function of the vessel, the 
accomplishment of its mission, its maintenance, or anchorage for future trips). In 
this way, the Supreme Court only partially adopted the rule because the 
requirement of work on board a vessel is missing from the Chandris holding. 
Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368. 
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must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable 
group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration 
and its nature.82 
Addressing the second prong, the Chandris Court directed the lower courts 
to stress that “the Jones Act was intended to protect sea-based maritime 
workers, who owe their allegiance to a vessel [or fleet of vessels], and not 
land-based employees, who do not.”83 
The Court also partially adopted the Fifth Circuit’s rule about mixed 
employment: generally, to qualify as seamen, workers must spend about 
30% of their time “in the service of a vessel in navigation.”84 The Court in 
Chandris emphasized that this rule is relevant only in the context of mixed 
employment workers like George;85 the rule is irrelevant when a worker is 
permanently assigned to a vessel-based or land-based position because in 
that case the court can determine seaman status based on the permanent 
employment status of the worker.86 In the case of mixed employment, the 
Court noted that seaman status is a “fact specific” inquiry,87 and lower 
courts have the flexibility to consider the circumstances surrounding the 
worker’s employment when applying the rule.88 
On the other hand, even before the Supreme Court decided Chandris, 
the Fifth Circuit was interpreting the “substantial connection”89 requirement 
as time spent working on a vessel rather than merely in the service of that 
vessel.90 In Barrett, the court addressed a case in which a worker spent 
                                                                                                             
 82. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368. Post-Chandris, the Supreme Court ruled that 
for a worker who works on an “identifiable group of . . . vessels” to qualify as a 
seaman, the vessels must be subject to “common ownership or control.” Harbor 
Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 556 (1997). 
 83. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 376. In Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 
927, 935 (5th Cir. 2015), the court discussed that terms and phrases like “sea-based” 
and “sea-based duties” should not be understood literally. Rather, “we have dozens of 
cases finding oilfield workers and other ‘brown-water’ workers on drilling barges and 
other vessels qualified as seamen even though they spent all their work time on these 
vessels submerged in quiet inland canals and waterways.” Naquin, 744 F.3d at 935. 
 84. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 371. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (citing McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 356 (1991)). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 375. 
 90. See, e.g., Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 107374 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (en banc); Barrios v. Engine & Gas Compressor Servs., Inc., 669 F.2d 
350, 353 (5th Cir. 1982); Holland v. Allied Structural Steel Co., 539 F.2d 476, 484 
(5th Cir. 1976). 
2018] COMMENT 1393 
 
 
 
most of his time on an oil platform and performed only incidental work on 
an adjacent vessel.91 The Barrett court relied on its earlier case, Robison, in 
which it held that for workers to qualify as seamen, they must either be 
permanently assigned to a vessel or perform a substantial portion of their 
work thereon.92 The Fifth Circuit has continued to use this interpretation, 
even using the language in Chandris93 to strengthen its argument that 
seaman status requires workers to spend at least 30% of their working time 
on a vessel to qualify as Jones Act seamen.94 The Fifth Circuit’s influence 
cannot be understated—the Supreme Court relied heavily on the Fifth 
Circuit’s decisions when deciding Chandris, including partially adopting 
the Fifth Circuit’s test for seaman status.95 The Supreme Court further 
adopted the Fifth Circuit’s 30% rule because of that court’s “years of 
experience” with the issue.96 The Fifth Circuit’s influence on the Supreme 
Court in maritime issues, as illustrated in the Supreme Court’s adoption of 
the Robison rule, also explains why the recent decision in Alexander is 
significant. The Alexander “on board a vessel” interpretation eventually 
may be adopted by the Supreme Court and become binding law in all 
jurisdictions. 
II. ALEXANDER V. EXPRESS ENERGY SERVICES, L.P.: A CHANGE IN COURSE 
The Fifth Circuit applied its interpretation of the Chandris two-pronged 
test to the facts of Alexander.97 Michael Alexander worked for Express, an 
oilfield services company for well construction and well testing services,98 
as a lead hand in the company’s plug and abandonment (“P&A”) 
department.99 The department worked to plug decommissioned oil wells on 
platforms off the coast of Louisiana.100 Alexander’s duties included 
supervising workers and ensuring that each operation was running smoothly 
                                                                                                             
 91. Barrett, 781 F.2d at 1068–70. 
 92. Id. at 1073 (citing Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959)). 
 93. “A worker who spends less than about 30 percent of his time in the service 
of a vessel in navigation should not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act . . . .” 
Alexander v. Express Energy Servs. Operating, L.P., 784 F.3d 1032, 1034 (5th Cir. 
2015) (quoting Chandris, 515 U.S. at 371). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 369. 
 96. Id. at 371. 
 97. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1035. 
 98. Company Overview of Express Energy Services, L.P., BLOOMBERG, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=33
041463 (last visited Feb. 20, 2018) [https://perma.cc/CS4B-VPTW].  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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and completed successfully.101 Significantly, he was never assigned to a 
specific platform or vessel, and the lift boats that he used were owned by 
Aries Marine Corporation, a company working with Express.102 On 
August 11, 2011, Alexander was working on a P&A project on a platform 
containing four wells.103 A lift boat was next to the platform with a catwalk 
connecting the boat to the platform.104 Alexander was working on the 
platform when a wireline from a crane on the lift boat snapped, causing a 
bridge plug and tool combination to fall and injure him.105 
A. Procedural History and the Parties’ Arguments  
Alexander filed an action under the Jones Act against Express and 
other defendants in the Eastern District of Louisiana, arguing that Express 
was negligent.106 Express filed a motion for summary judgment on seaman 
status, asserting that, as a platform-based worker, Alexander could not be 
a seaman.107 Express further argued that Alexander failed to satisfy either 
prong of Chandris because he neither “contribute[d] to the function of a 
vessel or the accomplishment of its mission because he worked on the 
wells on non-vessel fixed platforms”108 nor worked on a vessel for 30% of 
his employment time.109 The court found the fact that 35% of Alexander’s 
jobs involved the use of a lift boat to be insufficient.110 Instead, Express 
argued that because Alexander did not spend 30% of his total employment 
time physically on board the lift boat, he should not qualify as a seaman 
under the second prong of Chandris.111 Alexander argued that “he . . . 
contribute[d] to the function of the Aries liftboat” so as to satisfy the first 
Chandris prong.112 He also wrongly asserted that he spent 35% of time on 
the Aries lift boats, though Express conceded that at least 35% of his time 
involved the use of the lift boats.113 
                                                                                                             
 101. Id. 
 102. Alexander v. Express Energy Operating Servs., L.P., 2014 WL 1763172 
(E.D. La. Apr. 30, 2014) aff’d on other grounds, 784 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 103. Alexander v. Express Energy Operating Servs., 784 F.3d 1032, 1035 (5th 
Cir. 2015). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1035–36. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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The Eastern District granted Express’s motion for summary 
judgment,114 finding that Alexander did not satisfy the requirements for 
seaman status under the first prong of Chandris because his duties related 
to the fixed platform, not the vessel.115 The fact that Alexander engaged in 
various activities on board the lift boat, such as eating, sleeping, relaxing, 
storing his tools, and loading and unloading materials was not enough to 
qualify as seaman’s work under the first Chandris prong.116 In a footnote, 
the court stated that Alexander also had failed to satisfy the second 
prong.117 
B. The Fifth Circuit’s Reasoning and Interpretation of Chandris 
On appeal, the principal issue before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
was whether the district court erred in granting Express’s motion for 
summary judgment on seaman status or if the facts were such that the 
question should have gone to the jury.118 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
Eastern District’s decision on other grounds, focusing on the second prong 
of Chandris to determine whether Alexander qualified as a seaman.119 The 
                                                                                                             
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Alexander v. Express Energy Servs. Operating, L.P., 2014 WL 1763172 
(E.D. La. Apr. 30, 2014) aff’d on other grounds, 784 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 117. Id. at *4 n.6. The court in Alexander stated that Alexander’s activities on 
the boats did not qualify for the 30% of working time: 
In Hufnagel, the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff had no connection 
to the lift boat at issue, having never been on it before the job on which 
he was injured and having no expectation to ever return to that specific 
vessel, and that he had no connection with any other identifiable fleet of 
vessels . . . . Here, Alexander offers no evidence that he had ever been 
assigned to the L/B RAM X [the lift boat] before or that he would in the 
future . . . . He was never assigned to a specific platform or vessel. None 
of the lift boats used by Alexander were owned or operated by Express, 
rather it was Express’s customers that contracted for the lift boats. 
Id.  
 118. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1032. The Supreme Court stated in Chandris that 
summary judgment was appropriate in a determination of seaman status only 
“where undisputed facts reveal that a maritime worker has a clearly inadequate 
connection to vessels in navigation, the court may take the question from the jury 
by granting summary judgment or a directed verdict.” Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 
515 U.S. 347, 371 (1995). 
 119. The Fifth Circuit essentially disregarded the first Chandris prong and 
addressed whether Alexander satisfied the second prong (discussing whether 
Alexander had “a connection to a vessel in navigation . . . that [was] substantial 
in terms of both its duration and its nature”). Alexander, 784 F.3d at 103637. 
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court held that because Alexander failed to satisfy this second prong and 
did not qualify as a seaman, the issue did not need to go to a jury.120 Based 
on the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, Chandris requires at least 30% of an 
employee’s work to occur on board a vessel.121 Consequently, the court 
required that Alexander must have spent 30% or more of his working time 
on board either the lift boat or Express’s main vessel to qualify as a 
seaman.122 The fact that Alexander worked merely in connection with the 
lift boats for 30% of his time was insufficient to meet the test for seaman 
status; as a result, the court found that summary judgment was proper.123 
Under the facts in Alexander, the Fifth Circuit correctly found that 
Alexander had not satisfied the test for seaman status. Alexander had not 
spent 30% of working time on board a vessel to satisfy the two Chandris 
prongs because his work was performed in connection to the platforms and 
not a vessel. But the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning is flawed because it ignores 
and misstates important language in Chandris regarding the appropriate 
test for seaman status, leading to a result that will prove detrimental to the 
courts and the maritime community. Instead of the Fifth Circuit’s rigid “on 
board a vessel” interpretation, the test for seaman status should more 
accurately conform to the holding in Chandris and the purpose of the Jones 
Act: (1) whether the employee is “[doing] the ship’s work”124 to satisfy the 
first prong of Chandris;125 and (2) whether the employee is regularly 
exposed to marine perils for the requisite 30% of time to satisfy both the 
nature and duration elements of the second prong of Chandris.126 
III. ALEXANDER: A RIGID RULE WITH UNFORTUNATE CONSEQUENCES 
Rather than providing clarity in this murky area of maritime law, the 
Fifth Circuit further muddled the issue in Alexander. The Alexander 
holding complicates the issue of seaman status for courts and frustrates the 
interests of maritime employees and employers. The Fifth Circuit in 
Alexander interpreted the second prong of Chandris as applying the “on 
board a vessel” requirement that workers be employed strictly on a vessel 
for 30% of their working time to be seamen.127 In fact, Chandris requires 
                                                                                                             
 120. Id. at 1037. 
 121. Id. at 1034; Chandris, 515 U.S. 347. 
 122. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1034. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368 (citing McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 
U.S. 337, 355 (1991)). 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. 
 127. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1037. 
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that the worker be both working in the service “of the vessel or to the 
accomplishment of its mission”128 and have a “connection to [a] vessel . . 
. that is substantial in terms of both its duration and nature.”129 Express and 
Alexander’s opposing arguments in Alexander highlight the crux of the 
argument surrounding the exact meaning of the second prong.130 
A. How the Fifth Circuit Misinterpreted Chandris 
The Fifth Circuit stated in Alexander that the Chandris Court applied 
its rule from Robison,131 and, therefore, the second prong requires work on 
board a vessel.132 Chandris, however, neither requires workers to be 
assigned to a vessel nor to spend 30% of their time working on board a 
vessel.133 Addressing the second prong, the Chandris Court held that the 
worker’s connection to a vessel must be substantial in duration and 
nature.134 The Supreme Court discussed how work on board a vessel could 
lead to a finding of seaman status: “‘[i]f it can be shown that the employee 
performed a significant part of his work on board the vessel on which he 
was injured, with at least some degree of regularity and continuity, the test 
for seaman status will be satisfied.’”135 The underlying purpose of the 
substantial connection prong, however, is to separate sea-based maritime 
employees who regularly are exposed to marine perils from land-based 
workers who are not as sufficiently connected to a vessel.136 This purpose 
represents the spirit of the second prong. Rather than interpreting Chandris 
to require work on board a vessel, the lower courts should interpret the 
case to require work in service of a vessel as the first prong of the test for 
seaman status, paired with regular contact with marine perils for 30% of 
working time as the second prong of the test. 
The Fifth Circuit should clarify its decision by attempting to adhere 
more closely to Chandris. The Fifth Circuit and other lower courts should 
                                                                                                             
 128. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368 (citing McDermott Int’l, 498 U.S. at 355). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing that although Express argued 
that Alexander had to be working on board a vessel for 30% of time, Alexander 
argued that he had to be in service of a vessel for 30% of time). 
 131. The rule requires a worker to be either permanently assigned or perform 
a substantial amount of work on the vessel to qualify as a seaman. Offshore Co. 
v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959). 
 132. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1034. 
 133. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 376. 
 134. Id. at 375. 
 135. Id. at 36869 (quoting JENNER, supra note 20, § 11a). 
 136. Id. at 368. 
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follow Chandris and emphasize that the second prong reserves the Jones 
Act remedy for employees whose work regularly exposes them to “the 
special hazards and disadvantages to which they who go down to sea in 
ships are subjected.”137 Not only is this distinction emphasized in 
Chandris,138 but it also stresses the purpose of seaman status and avoids 
the test for that status from becoming a test in itself.139 In determining the 
Jones Act coverage qualifications, the Court “focus[ed] upon the essence 
of what it means to be a seaman and . . . eschew[ed] the temptation to 
create detailed tests . . . that tend to become ends in and of themselves.”140 
A rigid requirement that disregards the purpose of seaman status is an “end 
in and of [itself]”141 that does not accurately reflect the reality of modern 
maritime law.142 
In actuality, seamen are employees whose work takes place in the 
service of a vessel; consequently, they are exposed to marine perils in the 
course and scope of their employment that should warrant their protection 
under the Jones Act, even if those employees do not work on board a vessel 
for 30% of time.143 For instance, George and workers like him who do not 
work on board a vessel for 30% of their employment nevertheless are 
doing the ship’s work when, as in the hypothetical, the vessel’s function is 
to transport them to the rigs to work as well as to provide a platform from 
which the divers can store their diving and monitoring equipment and 
receive help from other workers still on the vessel.144 Diving and 
performing related tasks should qualify as doing the ship’s work because 
the mission of the vessel is to bring the diver to the site and serve as a 
platform. The fact that these workers are exposed to the same perils as 
classic seamen for a substantial period,145 coupled with the fact that they 
are doing the ship’s work, should classify them as seamen despite not 
working on a vessel for that time period. If courts keep the purpose of the 
                                                                                                             
 137. Id. at 370 (quoting Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 104 (1946) 
(Stone, C.J., dissenting)). See Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927, 
934 (5th Cir. 2014) (discussing how these dangers apply also in brown-water 
situations in which the worker is not strictly at sea). 
 138. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 376. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 369. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 376. 
 143. Id. at 378. 
 144. See Introduction supra p. 2. 
 145. See Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927, 934 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(discussing how these dangers apply also in brown-water situations in which the 
worker is not strictly at sea). 
2018] COMMENT 1399 
 
 
 
Jones Act in mind,146 they should find seaman status for employees who do 
not qualify under the Alexander Court’s “on board a vessel” interpretation.147 
This interpretation more closely aligns with the central purpose of the Jones 
Act and is preferable to the Fifth Circuit’s misinterpretation, which will bar 
those latter employees from the Act’s protection. 
1. How the Fifth Circuit Misinterpreted Chandris Dicta Concerning 
“On Board a Vessel” 
When deciding Alexander, the Fifth Circuit cited to specific language 
in Chandris in support of its conclusion that Alexander could not qualify 
as a seaman because he did not work 30% of time on board a vessel.148 
Though it may appear as if the Supreme Court intended the substantial 
connection prong to require time spent working on a vessel,149 the Court 
did not require work literally on board a vessel when determining its test 
for seaman status.150 The language in Chandris cited by the Fifth Circuit 
originated from A. Jenner, Benedict on Admiralty,151 in which the writer 
discussed that “if it can be shown that the employee performed a 
significant part of his work onboard the vessel on which he was injured, 
with at least some degree of regularity and continuity, the test for seaman 
status will be satisfied.”152 The Fifth Circuit also cited language which 
emphasized that if a worker’s duties take place on board a vessel for only 
a fraction of time, the worker is land-based and not a seaman.153 The Fifth 
Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s citation of this language as the 
Court’s adoption of its own rule derived from Robison and its progeny, 
which required a worker to work on board a vessel for at least 30% of time 
to be a seaman.154  
Under the second prong of Chandris, however, “the worker must have 
a connection to a vessel in navigation (or an identifiable group of vessels) 
that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.”155 If the 
Supreme Court intended this prong to require working on board a vessel, 
                                                                                                             
 146. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368. 
 147. Alexander v. Express Energy Operating Servs., L.P., 784 F.3d 1032, 1034 
(5th Cir. 2015). 
 148. Id. (citing Chandris, 515 U.S. at 36871). 
 149. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 36869. 
 150. Id. at 376. 
 151. Id. at 36869 (citing JENNER, supra note 20, § 11a, pp. 2-10.1 to 2-11). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1034 (citing Chandris, 515 U.S. at 371). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 376. 
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that language would have been simple to include, as the Fifth Circuit did 
in Robison and subsequent cases.156 Instead, the Supreme Court articulated 
the Fifth’s Circuit’s rule of thumb for the ordinary case: “A worker who 
spends less than about 30% of his time in the service of a vessel in 
navigation should not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act.”157 The 
Supreme Court used the language “in the service of a vessel”158 rather than 
“on board a vessel.”159 By refusing to adopt the “on board a vessel” 
language, the Supreme Court did not intend to require that 30% of 
employees’ working time be spent on a vessel. 
The Court notes that the purpose of the second prong is to distinguish 
between land-based workers and sea-based workers who are subjected to 
the kinds of maritime dangers as classic seamen.160 Though working on 
board a vessel is the classic nature of a seaman’s work, the Court notes 
that seamen are those maritime employees whose work “regularly 
expose[s] [them] to the perils of the sea.”161 Working on board a vessel is 
one way that the worker may be subjected to these marine perils, but it is 
not the only way. George, for example, faces these same perils during his 
employment, but he is not working on board a vessel for the requisite 
period. Because he faces these perils for 30% of time, George and others 
like him should qualify as seamen. If the workers are regularly exposed to 
these perils for 30% of their working time, thus satisfying the “nature” and 
“duration” elements, the second prong of Chandris is satisfied. It does not 
follow that the Court’s citation of the quote from Jenner, Benedict on 
Admiralty should be understood to require 30% of work to be done on 
board a vessel. This misinterpretation of the Chandris language will lead 
to unwelcome consequences in the lower courts and to maritime 
employers and employees. 
                                                                                                             
 156. See, e.g., Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959); Barrett 
v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1073–74 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc); 
Barrios v. Engine & Gas Compressor Servs., Inc., 669 F.2d 350, 353 (5th Cir. 
1982) (“To perform a substantial part of his work aboard a vessel, it must be 
shown that he performed a significant part of his work aboard the vessel with at 
least some degree of regularity and continuity.”); Holland v. Allied Structural 
Steel Co., 539 F.2d 476, 485 (5th Cir. 1976) (“[W]e have continued to analyze the 
question of seaman status by focusing on . . . the time spent aboard or in the service 
of a vessel . . . .”). 
 157. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 371 (emphasis added). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1034. 
 160. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 36872. 
 161. Id. at 368. 
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IV. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO THESE UNFORTUNATE CONSEQUENCES 
The Alexander court’s holding, which ignored the purpose of the Jones 
Act and misconstrued the language of Chandris, presents two main 
problems. First, the lower courts are faced with less discretion in cases, 
like George’s, that demand such discretion. Second, the decision creates 
practical problems for employees and employers when determining status 
and coverage, problems that could expose employers, in some limited but 
important circumstances, to greater liability in general maritime tort. 
A. Alexander’s Consequences in the Lower Courts 
Because of the “on board a vessel” reading of the Chandris two-prong 
test, the lower courts within the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction have less 
discretion in determining seaman status.162 This lack of discretion is 
especially problematic in cases in which the nature of the employees’ work 
and their exposure to marine perils should warrant seaman status, but these 
employees have not spent 30% of their working time on board a vessel. 
For instance, though a court could determine that George should qualify 
as a seaman because he is doing the ship’s work and is exposed to maritime 
dangers for 30% of his working time,163 it cannot grant seaman status after 
Alexander. George does not perform his work on board a vessel; instead, 
his working time takes place off the vessel. After Alexander, his time 
exposed to marine perils cannot be counted in the 30% of time calculation. 
To avoid this problem, courts should follow the spirit of Chandris and 
consider the nature of employees’ work in the service of a vessel and their 
exposure to marine perils, regardless of whether their work is physically 
on board that vessel, in determining whether the employees meet the 
requisite 30% of working time on board a vessel. 
When the Chandris Court discussed the Fifth Circuit’s 30% rule, it 
noted that although “departure from [the rule] will certainly be justified in 
appropriate cases,”164 the general rule arose because of “years of 
experience.”165 The Alexander “on board a vessel” requirement misapplies 
the 30% rule by not allowing the courts to consider off-vessel work in the 
service of the vessel where the worker is exposed to marine perils.166 
Instead, the Alexander requirement necessitates that the courts look only 
at “on the vessel” work rather than at the nature of employees’ work, that 
                                                                                                             
 162. Cf. Gimeno, supra note 74, § 203. 
 163. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368. 
 164. Id. at 371. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 372 (citing McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 356 (1991)). 
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is, work for the vessel that exposes them to marine perils. Further, 
Alexander ignores the Chandris language “in the service of a vessel”167 
and instead applies the language “on board a vessel”168 to create a more 
rigid rule that takes away the courts’ discretion. This lack of discretion 
may appear to make ruling on summary judgment easier,169 but applying 
this rigid rule ultimately will be more challenging without further guidance 
on the definition of work “on a vessel.”170 Further, the Alexander rule will 
prove fatal to cases like George’s, in which a worker spends a significant 
portion of his time exposed to marine perils in the service of a vessel or 
accomplishment of its mission. 
In response to this issue, the “on board a vessel” requirement from 
Alexander should be clarified by the Fifth Circuit.171 One way to improve 
this requirement is to apply a different methodology to the nature and the 
duration elements of the prong. This approach would allow courts to look 
collectively at the nature and duration of work done while exposed to 
classic marine dangers when factoring in the seaman’s connection to a 
vessel. If an employee like George is doing work to “contribut[e] to the 
function of a vessel or accomplishment of its mission,” and George is 
regularly exposed to those typical seaman perils, his work should count in 
the 30% of time calculation.172 Another way to remedy this issue is to limit 
the Alexander holding to those cases in which a worker does more work 
                                                                                                             
 167. Id. at 369. 
 168. Alexander v. Express Energy Operating Servs., L.P., 784 F.3d 1032, 1036 
(5th Cir. 2015). 
 169. David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, Recent Developments in 
Admiralty and Maritime Law at the National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits, 40 TUL. MAR. L.J. 343, 400 (2016). But see Hurst v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 
2015 WL 4397136 (E.D. La. July 16, 2015) (declining to grant summary 
judgment on seaman status); Pellegrin v. Monto Oilfield Contractors, L.L.C., 
2015 WL 3651159 (E.D. La. June 11, 2015) (ruling that there were other issues 
of fact that precluded summary judgment). 
 170. Alexander, 784 F.3d at 1036; see infra discussion Part IV.B.1. 
 171. This Comment does not advocate for Alexander to be overruled. The Fifth 
Circuit likely decided Alexander correctly even without changing the Chandris 
language because Alexander worked very little in the service of the lift boats or 
the main vessel. Id. Instead, this Comment argues that the “on board a vessel” 
requirement be clarified so as to either only apply to Alexander’s factual 
circumstances or that it should be only one of the ways in which, in this fact-
intensive methodology, courts can find seaman status. 
 172. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368. 
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on land or a fixed platform173 than on navigable waters, thus not extending 
the holding to all amphibious workers. 
Because the courts could consider the work employees perform while 
consistently in contact with marine perils, rather than merely the amount 
of work they perform on a vessel, courts could find seaman status for 
employees like George who do not perform 30% of work strictly on a 
vessel. This interpretation would ensure that workers employed in the 
service of a vessel and exposed to marine perils rightly qualify as seamen. 
If Alexander were limited to its facts, this limitation would allow for the 
courts’ discretion in deciding whether to grant summary judgment while 
leaving the rigid rule from Alexander intact. Without either this revised 
interpretation or limitation of Alexander, these workers for whom the 
Jones Act was passed will be barred from seaman protections.174 
1. Uniformity and Judicial Efficiency versus Discretion in the Lower 
Courts 
Although it may appear as though discretion in the courts creates 
problems for maritime law, which at its core strives to maintain 
uniformity,175 the Fifth Circuit’s 30% rigid requirement conflicts with the 
purpose of the Jones Act. The Supreme Court in Chandris noted that the 
federal courts were divided in determining the proper test for seaman 
status,176 particularly in addressing the second prong of the Robison test.177 
Creating a bright-line rule, which eliminates this division among the 
courts, seems to fulfill this purpose. It will be easier for the courts to grant 
summary judgment,178 the goal of which is judicial efficiency.179 With this 
principal concern in mind, this “on a vessel” rule could be an ostensible 
step toward furthering uniformity and consistency in maritime law. 
                                                                                                             
 173. See Hufnagel v. Omega Serv. Indus., Inc., 182 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(ruling that employee who worked on a fixed platform was not a seaman). 
 174. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 36970 (quoting Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 
328 U.S. 85, 104 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting)). See Naquin v. Elevating Boats, 
L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927, 934 (5th Cir. 2014) (discussing how these dangers apply 
also in brown-water situations in which the worker is not strictly at sea). 
 175. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917). 
 176. See, e.g., Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co., 123 F.2d 991 (1st Cir. 1941); 
Salgado v. M.J. Rudolph Corp., 514 F.2d 750, 755 (2d Cir. 1975); Offshore Co. 
v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959). 
 177. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 366. 
 178. Gimeno, supra note 74, § 203. 
 179. Summary Judgment, WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 
2005) (“The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials.”). 
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Although a court-led effort in creating a bright-line rule would be 
beneficial, the purpose of the Jones Act is to benefit injured employees.180 
To protect the interests of these employees, the courts should weigh the 
factual circumstances concerning the worker’s connection to a vessel in 
determining whether the worker is a seaman.181 The question of seaman 
status is a mixed question of law and fact,182 and the Supreme Court stated 
in Chandris that only “where undisputed facts reveal that a maritime 
worker has a clearly inadequate temporal connection to vessels in 
navigation, the court may take the question from the jury by granting 
summary judgment or a directed verdict.”183 When evaluating a case for 
seaman status, the courts should apply a fact-intensive inquiry to both the 
nature and duration elements of the worker’s employment rather than 
merely addressing whether the employee’s work occurred on board a 
vessel. 
Particularly in close cases, there are underlying questions of fact 
concerning the nature of the workers’ employment and their connection to 
a vessel. If the employee regularly faces marine perils for 30% of time and 
the nature of the employee’s work is in the service of a vessel, then the 
court should deny summary judgment on seaman status and submit the 
issue to the jury. If a judge decides the case based only on the Alexander 
“on board a vessel” requirement without considering other facts and 
circumstances, then summary judgment has been improperly granted. 
These facts and circumstances should include the question of whether the 
employee’s work on navigable waters satisfies the nature element, that is, 
whether the worker is regularly exposed to marine perils, and whether the 
worker has been employed for 30% of time in the service of a vessel to 
satisfy the duration element of the second prong. Because the purpose of 
the Jones Act is to protect the rights of workers exposed to classic maritime 
dangers,184 the goal of uniformity and appeal of a bright-line rule for 
judicial efficiency should not justify depriving these workers the 
protections of seaman status. 
                                                                                                             
 180. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 38586 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 181. Id. at 372 (majority opinion) (citing McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 
U.S. 337, 356 (1991)) (asserting that the test for seaman status is fact-intensive). 
 182. McDermott Int’l, 498 U.S. at 356; Chandris, 515 U.S. at 369; In re 
Endeavor Marine, Inc., 234 F.3d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Harbor Tug & 
Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 554 (1997)). 
 183. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 371. 
 184. Id. at 38586 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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B. Alexander’s Consequences for Employees and Employers 
Finally, Alexander creates practical problems when determining 
employees’ status and coverage. The extent of the Alexander holding is 
unclear and may apply only to employees like Alexander or to a larger 
group of amphibious workers. Employees will be unsure whether they 
qualify as seamen when attempting to sue for injuries. When employees 
and employers attempt to determine seaman status in a lawsuit, both will 
need to determine whether sufficient time has been spent working on a 
vessel. To accomplish this task, they must understand what it means to do 
work on a vessel. In short, the nature or duration elements of the second 
Chandris prong have not been clarified for either employees or employers. 
This decision in Alexander further frustrates the interests of employers,185 
as the inapplicability of the Jones Act to their employees exposes them to 
greater liability.186 
1. What “Work on Board a Vessel” Means 
The Alexander decision will cause employees and employers to 
question whether employees’ work qualifies as work on board a vessel. 
The Alexander Court complicated the question in its finding that eating 
and sleeping in the lift boat, as well as loading and unloading materials 
from the lift boat, did not qualify as work on board the vessel.187 These 
remaining questions will cause employees concern and create further 
tensions between employers and employees, potentially erupting in 
lawsuits over coverage and status. If the purpose of the Jones Act is to 
                                                                                                             
 185. Though this Comment focuses on the uncertainty and greater liability this 
Alexander decision creates, there could be other ramifications that are outside the 
scope of this Comment. For instance, employers may have to purchase more 
liability insurance, the costs of litigation may be greater, employees’ fees may 
change depending on their status, among other things. These issues may arise as 
the unfortunate ramifications of Alexander continue to ripple outward. 
 186. See Murray v. Anthony J. Bertucci Const. Co., 958 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 
1992) (extending Miles to deny loss of society damages to a seaman in an injury 
case); Guevara v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995), abrogated 
by Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 424–25 (2009) (finding seaman 
is entitled to seek punitive damages for willful and wanton failure to pay 
maintenance and cure, not for Jones Act negligence); McBride v. Estis Well Serv., 
L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 390 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015); 
see also SCHOENBAUM, supra note 10, at 170. 
 187. Alexander v. Express Energy Operating Servs., L.P., 2014 WL 1763172 
(E.D. La. Apr. 30, 2014), aff’d on other grounds, 784 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir. 2015). 
1406 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
 
 
protect maritime workers who are “exposed to the perils of the sea,”188 the 
Act should protect workers who are exposed constantly to potential injury 
or death doing the ship’s work, even if they are not on board a vessel for 
30% of their employment. Commercial divers like George are the 
paradigmatic example189 because very little of their work takes place on 
board a vessel.190 Yet even those workers who are on board a vessel for 
less than 30% of time may be employed in work that exposes them to 
marine perils for a temporally significant period.191 Nonetheless, if an 
employee does not work on board a vessel for that period, regardless of 
the nature of their work or their exposure to marine perils, that employee 
will be precluded from enjoying seaman status after Alexander. 
Employees should not have to contend with a rule that has the potential 
to deprive them of seaman status. Classic seamen, who work on board a 
vessel for the clear majority of their employment, will not experience the 
effects of this rule, nor will those employees who are obviously land-based 
and are only incidentally on vessels. But Alexander will prove fatal to 
seaman status for amphibious employees who are not employed on a 
vessel for the requisite time—like George the diver. Obviously, however, 
these workers should be “sea-based”192 employees for purposes of 
receiving Jones Act protections.193 The employees’ work on navigable 
waters should count toward the 30% of time calculation—not only because 
they are exposed to marine perils for which the Jones Act was passed but 
also because they are working in the service of a vessel or accomplishment 
of its mission, even when not literally on board the vessel. The Alexander 
holding requires clarification to determine what qualifies as work on board 
a vessel and the breadth of the decision. 
                                                                                                             
 188. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 358. 
 189. Independent pilots are another example; although they may work in the 
service of a vessel or fleet of vessels every day to easily satisfy the first prong of 
Chandris, they do not necessarily work on board a vessel for 30% of their 
employment. See Bach v. Trident S.S. Co., Inc., 947 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1991), 
cert. granted and remanded, 500 U.S. 949 (1991). Nevertheless, they are regularly 
exposed to marine perils for which seaman’s protections exist. 
 190. John R. Hillsman, Have All the Recent Twists and Turns in the Jones Act 
Left Deep Sea Divers High and Dry?, 11 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 47, 62–63 (1999). 
 191. Wallace v. Oceaneering Int’l, 727 F.2d 427, 436 (5th Cir.1984) (“A 
diver's work necessarily involves exposure to numerous marine perils, and is 
inherently maritime because it cannot be done on land.”). 
 192. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 363; see Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 
F.3d 927, 934 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Stewart v. Dutra Const. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 
497 (2005)) (illustrating that “sea-based” should not be taken literally, and applies 
in brown-water situations). 
 193. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 376. 
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2. Greater Liability in Tort for Employers Under Alexander 
The Alexander decision at first glance appears to benefit employers, 
who no doubt will welcome the decision in Alexander for a variety of 
reasons. First, the decision helps employers to determine which of their 
employees are Jones Act seamen by creating a bright-line rule that is easy 
to apply. This rule makes it harder for at least some amphibious workers 
to qualify as seamen. It is advantageous for an employee to qualify as a 
seaman because seamen are granted protections that other marine workers 
are not,194 in addition to having the ability to bring a Jones Act action for 
negligence that employs an easier burden of proof for causation than 
general maritime law.195 The Alexander interpretation appears to limit 
employers’ Jones Act liability from those workers who will no longer 
qualify as seamen. Although seamen are usually given greater protection 
under the Jones Act, in certain limited instances the Jones Act minimizes 
employers’ liability.196 This limitation of liability is particularly applicable 
in the context of certain non-pecuniary damages, such as claims for loss 
of society, loss of consortium, and punitive damages. 
Courts have ruled that under the Jones Act, the spouse of an injured 
seaman cannot sue for loss of society or loss of consortium.197 Thus, if 
George qualified as a seaman, Susan could not bring an action for loss of 
society or consortium against Black Mud. Further, seamen themselves are 
precluded from recovering certain kinds of non-pecuniary damages, 
                                                                                                             
 194. deGravelles, supra note 11, at 209 (listing these protections as maintenance 
and cure, unseaworthiness, and a negligence action under the Jones Act). 
 195. Hoang Do, supra note 11, at 386; see Comeaux v. T.L. James & Co., 702 
F.2d 1023, 1024 (5th Cir. 1983); Charles v. West Indies Transp., 631 F. Supp. 
1023, 1025 (D.P.R. 1986). 
 196. See McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 390–91 (5th Cir. 
2014) (holding that recovery for unseaworthiness under Jones Act or general maritime 
law is limited to pecuniary losses, which does not include punitive damages); Miles 
v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 37 (1990) (holding that a maritime cause of action 
for wrongful death does not include loss of society); see also Murray v. Anthony J. 
Bertucci Const. Co., 958 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1992) (extending Miles to deny loss of 
society damages to a seaman in an injury case); Guevara v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 59 
F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995), abrogated by Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 
404 (2009) (seaman is entitled to seek punitive damages for willful and wanton failure 
to pay maintenance and cure, not for Jones Act negligence). 
 197. Miles, 498 U.S. at 37 (holding that a maritime cause of action for 
wrongful death does not include loss of society); Butler v. Ingram Barge Co., 2015 
WL 1517438, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 1, 2015). 
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including punitive damages, against their employer.198 If these workers are 
not covered under the Jones Act, then they typically will be covered 
exclusively under the LHWCA and will have no tort remedy against their 
employers.199 For cases in which an employer owns the vessels on which 
workers are injured and workers are injured by vessel negligence, however, 
the dual capacity doctrine may apply.200 These workers, like George, may 
bring actions for punitive damages,201 and their spouses, like Susan, may 
bring an action for non-pecuniary damages, such as loss of society and 
consortium.202 In this limited but important situation, Alexander has the 
potential to expose employers to greater liability in general maritime tort. 
3. The Fifth Circuit Must Clarify Its Decision for Employees and 
Employers 
If the Fifth Circuit clarifies its decision in Alexander, employees and 
employers will be better informed as to their responsibilities and coverage. 
The Fifth Circuit needs to clarify what it means to perform work “on board a 
                                                                                                             
 198. See Murray, 958 F.2d 127 (extending Miles to deny loss of society 
damages to a seaman in an injury case); Guevara, 59 F.3d 1496 (seaman is entitled 
to seek punitive damages for willful and wanton failure to pay maintenance and 
cure, not for Jones Act negligence); McBride, 768 F.3d at 390–91. 
 199. The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 902 
(2018). 
 200. If the employer is also the vessel owner and is acting in its capacity as 
vessel owner, then the injured worker may have a claim against the employer in 
that capacity. 33 U.S.C. §§ 904, 905(b), 933. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. 
Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983); Jones v. Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring Co., 354 F. 
App’x 143 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 201. See The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546, 558 (1818) (stating that punitive damages 
may be awarded for gross, wanton, and outrageous conduct); Gallagher v. The Yankee, 9 
Fed. Cas. 1091, 1093 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 18124) (finding that punitive damages 
could be awarded against a vessel master who illegally transported the plaintiff to the 
Sandwich Islands); see also In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d 89, 105 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(finding that the death claimants’ motion for punitive damages was properly denied 
because there was no showing of gross negligence, actual malice, or criminal indifference); 
In re Complaint of Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d 622, 626 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that 
general maritime law affords the remedy of punitive damages upon a showing of willful 
and wanton misconduct by the shipowner). If the worker qualifies as a longshoreman, he 
has punitive damages rights in his general maritime law claims. See Rutherford v. Mallard 
Bay Drilling, L.L.C., 2000 WL 805230 (E.D. La. June 21, 2000); Robert Force, The 
Legacy of Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 30 TUL. MAR. L.J. 35, 50 (2006). 
 202. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 10, at 170. 
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vessel,”203 in terms of the nature and duration of the work being done and 
explain the breadth of the Alexander holding. At this point, the Fifth Circuit 
may confine the holding to the facts of Alexander-like workers—those who 
work on fixed platforms—or may apply the holding to all workers with mixed 
employment.204 If the court determines that the Alexander holding does not 
extend to all amphibious workers, defining “work on board a vessel” may not 
be necessary. 
If the holding of Alexander extends to all amphibious employees, then 
this decision has greater bearing on those workers who will be barred from 
coverage if their work does not qualify as work on board a vessel. From the 
language of the Alexander opinion, it appears that the Fifth Circuit intended 
this “on a vessel” rule to apply to all workers with mixed employment. Indeed, 
the Eastern District of Louisiana is already interpreting Alexander in this 
way.205 It is unclear whether this interpretation reflects the Fifth Circuit’s true 
intent. The Fifth Circuit must clarify the breadth of its decision because 
answering this question is crucial to the subsequent development of the test 
for seaman status. 
For employers, the solution is more difficult. The Fifth Circuit, through 
Alexander, has denied seaman status to a class of amphibious workers, and if 
this class seeks damages, these awards could include punitive damages206 and 
damages for loss of society and loss of consortium.207 Some of these workers 
will qualify for coverage under the LHWCA, which will be their exclusive 
remedy against their employer.208 The “dual capacity” doctrine, however, 
may apply,209 which could expose the employer to paying worker’s 
                                                                                                             
 203. Alexander v. Express Energy Operating Servs., L.P., 784 F.3d 1032, 1036 
(5th Cir. 2015). 
 204. See id. at 1035. 
 205. See Pellegrin v. Montco Oilfield Contractors, L.L.C., 2015 WL 3651159 
(E.D. La. June 11, 2015) (applying Alexander’s 30% of time on board a vessel 
rule in its determination of whether granting summary judgment on seaman status 
was appropriate). 
 206. See The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. at 558 (stating that punitive damages 
may be awarded for gross, wanton, and outrageous conduct); Gallagher, 9 Fed. 
Cas. at 1093 (finding that punitive damages could be awarded against a vessel 
master who illegally transported the plaintiff to the Sandwich Islands); see also In 
re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d at 1972; In re Complaint of Merry Shipping, 
Inc., 650 F.2d 622. 
 207. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 10, at 170. 
 208. The Longshore and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 
902 (2018). 
 209. If the employer is also the vessel owner and acting in its capacity as vessel 
owner, then the injured worker may have a claim against the employer in that 
capacity. 33 U.S.C. §§ 904, 905(b), 933. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. 
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compensation under the LWHCA and general tort damages.210 Further, within 
the Fifth Circuit, if the worker is not covered under either the Jones Act or the 
LHWCA but is injured through employer negligence, then that employee may 
bring a general maritime law tort claim against his employer.211 Under these 
circumstances, the employer is exposed to greater liability. The solution will 
depend on the Fifth Circuit’s clarification of the issue of the employee’s 
duration and nature requirements. The class of seamen no longer covered 
under the Jones Act will affect the employer’s liability. 
a. The “On Board a Vessel” Requirement Opposes the Purpose of 
the Jones Act 
Arguably, clarification is unnecessary because the Alexander rule is 
easier to apply than the process of looking at whether the amphibious worker 
is doing the ship’s work and is exposed to marine perils. Yet the Jones Act 
was enacted in 1920 to further protect sea-based employees from the dangers 
of working on navigable waters.212 This “on board a vessel” interpretation, 
which detracts from this protection, opposes the purpose of the Jones Act and 
the policy behind its creation.213 It cannot be justified by merely aiding 
employers in determining coverage because aiding employers while unjustly 
depriving “sea-based” employees of seaman status opposes the purpose of the 
Jones Act.214 
Further, even though general maritime claims for punitive damages and 
certain non-pecuniary damages have a higher burden of proof215 than in Jones 
Act cases,216 non-seamen workers still will be able to bring claims against 
their employers in dual-capacity situations.217 Some of these claims will result 
in awards for punitive damages, loss of consortium, and loss of society. The 
Fifth Circuit should clarify what it means to be doing work on a vessel and 
                                                                                                             
Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983); Jones v. Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring Co., 354 F. 
App’x 143 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 210. See supra note 209. 
 211. Green v. Vermilion Corp., 144 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 1998); see Kermerac v. 
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959). 
 212. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 38586 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Estate of Callas 
v. United States, 682 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 216. Hoang Do, supra note 11; see Comeaux v. T.L. James & Co., 702 F.2d 
1023, 1024 (5th Cir. 1983); Charles v. West Indies Transp., 631 F. Supp. 1023, 1025 
(D.P.R. 1986). 
 217. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983); Jones 
v. Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring Co., 354 F. App’x 143 (5th Cir. 2009). 
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the breadth of its holding in Alexander. Without clarification, the issue of 
determining status and coverage will not only continue to plague employers 
and employees but also make the process even more challenging. Finally, 
amphibious employees like George should qualify as Jones Act seamen 
because of the nature of their work and their time spent exposed to marine 
perils. These solutions conform to the purpose of the Jones Act and balance 
the concerns of maritime employers and employees. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fifth Circuit erroneously interpreted the Chandris holding, reaching 
a result that produced unwelcome consequences. The “on a vessel” 
requirement will affect the lower courts within the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction 
as well as maritime employees and employers. Some “sea-based” employees 
will be barred from seaman coverage, whereas their employers will need to 
reevaluate the nature of their employees’ work to determine whether they 
qualify as seamen, longshoreman, or otherwise. Additionally, employers will 
face greater potential liability for workers who no longer qualify as seamen. 
Alexander should be clarified to reflect the intended purpose of the Jones 
Act218 and the true spirit of Chandris.219 Until either the Fifth Circuit clarifies 
the decision or the breadth of the Alexander holding, the court’s “on board a 
vessel” interpretation of Chandris and the resulting consequences directly 
conflict with the purposes underlying seaman’s protections. 
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